[PATCH v3 0/1] MR10174: bcryptprimitives: Abort if ProcessPrng fails
[`ProcessPrng`] is documented as always returning TRUE. So I've modified `ProcessPrng` to abort on errors. This is I believe an import aspect of the function. See Microsoft's [The Windows 10 random number generation infrastructure] whitepaper.
We also have the property that a request for random bytes never fails. In the past our RNG functions could return an error code. We have observed that there are many callers that never check for the error code, even if they are generating cryptographic key material. This can lead to serious security vulnerabilities if an attacker manages to create a situation in which the RNG infrastructure returns an error. For that reason, the Win10 RNG infrastructure will never return an error code and always produce high-quality random bytes for every request.
[`ProcessPrng`]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/seccng/processprng [The Windows 10 random number generation infrastructure]: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2019/11/25/going-in-depth-on-t... -- v3: bcryptprimitives: Abort if ProcessPrng fails https://gitlab.winehq.org/wine/wine/-/merge_requests/10174
From: Chris Denton <chris@chrisdenton.dev> `ProcessPrng` is documented as always returning TRUE[1]. So I've modified `ProcessPrng` to abort on errors. This is I believe an import aspect of the function. See Microsoft's "The Windows 10 random number generation infrastructure" whitepaper[2].
We also have the property that a request for random bytes never fails. In the past our RNG functions could return an error code. We have observed that there are many callers that never check for the error code, even if they are generating cryptographic key material. This can lead to serious security vulnerabilities if an attacker manages to create a situation in which the RNG infrastructure returns an error. For that reason, the Win10 RNG infrastructure will never return an error code and always produce high-quality random bytes for every request.
[1]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/seccng/processprng [2]: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2019/11/25/going-in-depth-on-t... --- dlls/bcryptprimitives/main.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/dlls/bcryptprimitives/main.c b/dlls/bcryptprimitives/main.c index 6562d672389..ab4d57501d2 100644 --- a/dlls/bcryptprimitives/main.c +++ b/dlls/bcryptprimitives/main.c @@ -16,12 +16,20 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA */ +#include <assert.h> #include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + #include "windef.h" #include "winbase.h" #include "ntsecapi.h" +#include "wine/debug.h" + +WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(bcrypt); BOOL WINAPI ProcessPrng(BYTE *data, SIZE_T size) { - return RtlGenRandom(data, size); + RtlGenRandom( data, size ) + /* ProcessPrng is documented as always returning TRUE */ + return TRUE; } -- GitLab https://gitlab.winehq.org/wine/wine/-/merge_requests/10174
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Christopher Denton (＠cdenton)