Hiya Chip,
I don't have an answer off the top of my head. But let's see if we can unpack that ASN.1 a bit.
First, with the type, notice that crypt32_private.h defines a few useful types that Microsoft omitted for some reason from their public header, including: #define ASN_SETOF (ASN_UNIVERSAL | ASN_PRIMITIVE | 0x11) Okay, so that's what we're dealing with.
Next, to help sort it out: write each of the blobs to a binary, and interpret it with "openssl asn1parse -dump -i -inform DER". Here's the output from PKCSSignerWithUnknownItem31:
0:d=0 hl=4 l= 146 cons: SEQUENCE 4:d=1 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :00 7:d=1 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SEQUENCE 9:d=2 hl=2 l= 20 cons: SEQUENCE 11:d=3 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET 13:d=4 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE 15:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName 20:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :Juan Lang 31:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01 34:d=1 hl=2 l= 6 cons: SEQUENCE 36:d=2 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OBJECT :1.2.3 40:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL 42:d=1 hl=2 l= 96 cons: SET 44:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: EOC (a bunch of these omitted) 140:d=1 hl=2 l= 6 cons: SEQUENCE 142:d=2 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OBJECT :1.5.6 146:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL 148:d=1 hl=2 l= 0 prim: OCTET STRING
And here's the output from PKCSSignerWithAuthAttrAndUnknownItem31: 0:d=0 hl=4 l= 196 cons: SEQUENCE 4:d=1 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :00 7:d=1 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SEQUENCE 9:d=2 hl=2 l= 20 cons: SEQUENCE 11:d=3 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET 13:d=4 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE 15:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName 20:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :Juan Lang 31:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01 34:d=1 hl=2 l= 6 cons: SEQUENCE 36:d=2 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OBJECT :1.2.3 40:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL 42:d=1 hl=2 l= 32 cons: cont [ 0 ] 44:d=2 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE 46:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName 51:d=3 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SET 53:d=4 hl=2 l= 21 cons: SEQUENCE 55:d=5 hl=2 l= 19 cons: SET 57:d=6 hl=2 l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE 59:d=7 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName 64:d=7 hl=2 l= 10 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :Juan Lang 76:d=1 hl=2 l= 96 cons: SET 78:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: EOC (again, a bunch of these omitted) 174:d=1 hl=2 l= 6 cons: SEQUENCE 176:d=2 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OBJECT :1.5.6 180:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL 182:d=1 hl=2 l= 16 prim: OCTET STRING 0000 - 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07-08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f ................
You can see that in the latter case, you've got a context-specific tag of 0 wrapping a sequence containing a non-empty set. That context-specific [0] looks an awful lot like "signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL," no? And SignedAttributes is defined as "SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute".
Anyway, in the latter case, the signed attributes precede the set, and in the former case they're missing.
In addition to that, it's not entirely clear from your test results that it's expected to succeed in Windows in either case:
+ ret = pCryptDecodeObjectEx(dwEncoding, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, + PKCSSignerWithAuthAttrAndUnknownItem31, + sizeof(PKCSSignerWithAuthAttrAndUnknownItem31), + CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &buf, &size); + if (ret)
You don't have an ok(ret) here. I can't blame you too much for that, though: it looks like I omitted a bunch of ok(ret)s in my tests too. Sigh. Sorry about that. Could you add that and see what that turns up? --Juan
On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 11:57 PM, Charles Davis cdavis5x@gmail.com wrote:
Hi Juan,
I need some advice.
Attached is a patch to fix bug 34388, where an app that tries to verify its code signature fails because Wine, while parsing the certificates embedded within the signature, encounters an item in the CMS signer info (tag 0x31, i.e. ASN_UNIVERSAL | ASN_CONSTRUCTOR | 0x11), right before the HashEncryptionAlgorithm sequence item, that it doesn't yet know how to decode. This patch (which just skips the item in question) allows that app to successfully verify its code signature and run, but...
My testing on Windows (cf. job 2037 on newtestbot) shows some interesting behavior. Windows will indeed accept this item, but only if the AuthAttrs item is also present and immediately precedes it in the sequence. (The other test bails out with CRYPT_E_ASN_BADTAG.) I don't quite know what to make of this. The odd thing is that the certificate in question doesn't have this optional AuthAttrs item, and yet (in most cases, at least) most people who run this particular app on Windows do not have this problem. I can't seem to find anything about this from reading the relevant RFCs. Is there something I'm missing?
Thanks.
Chip