Stefan Dösinger wrote:
As long as the facilities exist for keeping an entire wine bottle isolated from other bottles (and ~/) I don't see this being a major issue.
They don't.
Even if you don't have a drive link pointing out of a bottle, a Windows app running in Wine can still call Linux syscalls(int 0x80). This is possible/needed because Windows apps run as a regular Linux process that links in Linux libraries which perform linux syscalls.
So any Windows malware can break out of the Wine "sandbox"(which isn't a sandbox really) by simply using linux syscalls.
On more recent distros (FC9/10) SELinux is enabled by default. Rolling a policy specifically for an untrusted bottle would severely limit the damage it could do. It could restrict all unnecessary read/write/execute access outside of the ~/.wine folder for wineserver and the program.
I see your point though, since none of the aforementioned security precautions are commonplace or specifically targeted to wine.