[PATCH v2 3/5] secur32: Properly handle NULL pInput argument for DTLS contexts in schan_InitializeSecurityContextW.

[Hans Leidekker]

From: Connor McAdams

When a NULL pInput argument is passed into InitializeSecurityContextW
for an existing DTLS context, we need to retransmit the last handshake
packet.

v2: Always initialize expected_size to 0.

Signed-off-by: Connor McAdams 
Signed-off-by: Hans Leidekker 
---
 dlls/secur32/schannel.c       | 43 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
 dlls/secur32/tests/schannel.c | 10 ++++----
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/dlls/secur32/schannel.c b/dlls/secur32/schannel.c
index 71993e1d2d6..c4e01c1e2a7 100644
--- a/dlls/secur32/schannel.c
+++ b/dlls/secur32/schannel.c
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ static SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY schan_InitializeSecurityContextW(
     struct schan_context *ctx;
     struct schan_buffers *out_buffers;
     struct schan_credentials *cred;
-    SIZE_T expected_size = ~0UL;
+    SIZE_T expected_size = 0;
     SECURITY_STATUS ret;
     SecBuffer *buffer;
     SecBuffer alloc_buffer = { 0 };
@@ -823,30 +823,33 @@ static SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY schan_InitializeSecurityContextW(
         unsigned char *ptr;

if (!(ctx = schan_get_object(phContext->dwLower, SCHAN_HANDLE_CTX))) return SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE;
-        if (!pInput) return is_dtls_context(ctx) ? SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY : SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE;
-        if ((idx = schan_find_sec_buffer_idx(pInput, 0, SECBUFFER_TOKEN)) == -1) return SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE;
+        if (!pInput && !is_dtls_context(ctx)) return SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE;

-        buffer = &pInput->pBuffers[idx];
-        ptr = buffer->pvBuffer;
-        expected_size = 0;
-
-        while (buffer->cbBuffer > expected_size + ctx->header_size)
+        if (pInput)
         {
-            record_size = ctx->header_size + read_record_size(ptr, ctx->header_size);
+            if ((idx = schan_find_sec_buffer_idx(pInput, 0, SECBUFFER_TOKEN)) == -1) return SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE;

-            if (buffer->cbBuffer < expected_size + record_size) break;
-            expected_size += record_size;
-            ptr += record_size;
-        }
+            buffer = &pInput->pBuffers[idx];
+            ptr = buffer->pvBuffer;

-        if (!expected_size)
-        {
-            TRACE("Expected at least %lu bytes, but buffer only contains %u bytes.\n",
-                  max(ctx->header_size + 1, record_size), buffer->cbBuffer);
-            return SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE;
-        }
+            while (buffer->cbBuffer > expected_size + ctx->header_size)
+            {
+                record_size = ctx->header_size + read_record_size(ptr, ctx->header_size);

-        TRACE("Using expected_size %lu.\n", expected_size);
+                if (buffer->cbBuffer < expected_size + record_size) break;
+                expected_size += record_size;
+                ptr += record_size;
+            }
+
+            if (!expected_size)
+            {
+                TRACE("Expected at least %lu bytes, but buffer only contains %u bytes.\n",
+                      max(ctx->header_size + 1, record_size), buffer->cbBuffer);
+                return SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE;
+            }
+
+            TRACE("Using expected_size %lu.\n", expected_size);
+        }

if (phNewContext) *phNewContext = *phContext;
     }
diff --git a/dlls/secur32/tests/schannel.c b/dlls/secur32/tests/schannel.c
index 6fbe0c34bd1..afcc382927a 100644
--- a/dlls/secur32/tests/schannel.c
+++ b/dlls/secur32/tests/schannel.c
@@ -1693,17 +1693,17 @@ static void test_dtls(void)
     ctx_handle2.dwLower = ctx_handle2.dwUpper = 0xdeadbeef;
     status = InitializeSecurityContextA( &cred_handle, &ctx_handle, (SEC_CHAR *)"winetest", flags_req, 0, 16, NULL, 0,
                                          &ctx_handle2, &buffers[1], &attr, &exp );
-    todo_wine ok( status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED, "got %08x\n", status );
+    ok( status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED, "got %08x\n", status );

flags_ret = ISC_RET_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION | ISC_RET_STREAM | ISC_RET_EXTENDED_ERROR | ISC_RET_DATAGRAM |
                 ISC_RET_USED_SUPPLIED_CREDS | ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY | ISC_RET_SEQUENCE_DETECT | ISC_RET_REPLAY_DETECT;
-    todo_wine ok( attr == flags_ret, "got %08x\n", attr );
+    ok( attr == flags_ret, "got %08x\n", attr );
     todo_wine ok( exp.LowPart, "got %08x\n", exp.LowPart );
     todo_wine ok( exp.HighPart, "got %08x\n", exp.HighPart );
     ok( buffers[1].pBuffers[1].BufferType == SECBUFFER_ALERT, "Expected buffertype SECBUFFER_ALERT, got %#x\n", buffers[1].pBuffers[1].BufferType);
-    todo_wine ok( !buffers[1].pBuffers[1].cbBuffer, "Expected SECBUFFER_ALERT buffer to be empty, got %#x\n", buffers[1].pBuffers[1].cbBuffer);
-    todo_wine ok( ctx_handle.dwLower == ctx_handle2.dwLower, "dwLower mismatch, expected %#lx, got %#lx\n", ctx_handle.dwLower, ctx_handle2.dwLower);
-    todo_wine ok( ctx_handle.dwUpper == ctx_handle2.dwUpper, "dwUpper mismatch, expected %#lx, got %#lx\n", ctx_handle.dwUpper, ctx_handle2.dwUpper);
+    ok( !buffers[1].pBuffers[1].cbBuffer, "Expected SECBUFFER_ALERT buffer to be empty, got %#x\n", buffers[1].pBuffers[1].cbBuffer);
+    ok( ctx_handle.dwLower == ctx_handle2.dwLower, "dwLower mismatch, expected %#lx, got %#lx\n", ctx_handle.dwLower, ctx_handle2.dwLower);
+    ok( ctx_handle.dwUpper == ctx_handle2.dwUpper, "dwUpper mismatch, expected %#lx, got %#lx\n", ctx_handle.dwUpper, ctx_handle2.dwUpper);

/* With no new input buffer, output buffer length should match prior call. */
     todo_wine ok(buffers[1].pBuffers[0].cbBuffer == prev_buf_len, "Output buffer size mismatch, expected %#x, got %#x\n",