On 21 September 2010 08:58, Mike Frysinger vapier@gentoo.org wrote:
On Tuesday, September 21, 2010 03:34:33 Reece Dunn wrote:
On 20 September 2010 17:51, Mike Frysinger vapier@gentoo.org wrote:
well, i dont think this issue is limited to shell32. it's just the only one to hit it atm. what about my other patch i posted ? http://www.winehq.org/pipermail/wine-patches/2010-September/093377.html
How does fortify work?
fortify is only adding security/sanity checks to functions. so if you do: char f[1]; strcpy(f, "1234"); the C library, with help from the compiler, will then perform constant checks on these things. since 5 bytes is more than the storage of "f" can hold, you get a build time warning. and then at runtime, if this code is attempted to be executed, it will abort() before the storage is allowed to overflow.
the problem with the wine code is that it declares a buffer as 1 byte long even though in reality it is the start of a flexible string. newer C specs account for this behavior by introducing the "[]" syntax. the C library will not perform length checks on these strings since it has no idea what its limits are at build time.
Ah, I see.
You could always do something like:
strcpy((char *)pidl->anysize, "1234");
Which would force the compiler to use the char * version instead of the char [n] version of the strcpy function in this example.
This would then work in any compiler without special casing for compilers that have fortify -- especially when public structures get impacted.
- Reece