Hi Michael,
It could be discussed whether sha1 is still considered secure enough
It isn't. Google published a blog post today. [1]
Regards, Ivan
[1] https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html
On Thursday, 2 February 2017 15:45:31 CET Michael Müller wrote:
Hello Kristian,
it is true that the download is done via HTTP, but there is a checksum verification using a hardcoded hash value after the download. See http://source.winehq.org/git/wine.git/blob/HEAD:/dlls/appwiz.cpl/addons.c for more details. It could be discussed whether sha1 is still considered secure enough, but I think there is a reason why it was chosen. Wine is modular and can be built without a cryptographic library (gnutls / CommonCrypto) and then lacks support for TLS and most hash functions. SHA1 is built into Wine though. Using this method guarantees that the download will also work in a minimal Wine built.
Regards, Michael
Am 02.02.2017 um 15:00 schrieb Kristian Erik Hermansen:
Hello Wine Maintainers :)
Wine v2.x, and likely all earlier version, contain remotely exploitable flaws because binaries are downloaded via insecure plaintext HTTP and appear to contain insufficient signature verification. This can occur when prompted to download missing files such as Wine Gecko. The connection occurs over HTTP and can be intermediated to compromise the client machine with a malicious payload. Please advise if you are not already aware of this, when a fix is planned, and if you need any additional information. Thanks :)